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The Differential-Phase-Shift (DPS) and the Coherent-One-Way (COW) are among the most prac-
tical protocols for quantum cryptography, and are therefore the object of fast-paced experimental
developments. The assessment of their security is also a challenge for theorists: the existing tools,
that allow to prove security against the most general attacks, do not apply to these two protocols
in any straightforward way. We present new upper bounds for their security in the limit of large
distances (d >∼ 50km with typical values in optical fibers) by considering a large class of collective
attacks, namely those in which the adversary attaches ancillary quantum systems to each pulse or
to each pair of pulses. We introduce also two modified versions of the COW protocol, which may
prove more robust than the original one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the recent years quantum cryptography evolved from nice physics to a technology that could revolutionize the
science of secrecy. The basic idea, as formulated by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), was based on the use of
individual qubits [1], quickly “translated” to individual photons. Given the lack of convenient single photon sources,
most experiments use instead weak laser pulses. However, it was then realized that such sources sometimes emit
multiphoton pulses and are thus in danger of photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [2]. The cheap counter-measure
to PNS attacks is to reduce further the intensity of the weak laser pulses, but this solution leads to secret bit rates
that scale quadratically with the quantum channel transmission coefficient, r ∝ t2. Hwang found an elegant way
out of this drawback, suggesting using more than one intensity [3]. This method, called decoy state implementation,
allows one to achieve a linear secret key rate, as for the historical single-qubit protocols [4].
The BB84 protocol in all its implementations, several variations thereof — two-state [5], six-state [6], SARG04
[7], protocols using higher-dimensional systems [8], etc. — and all the corresponding entanglement-based versions
[9], share a common feature: they all send quantum symbols one by one. However, convenient telecom laser sources
emit either a continuous train of pulses (mode-locked lasers), or a continuous wave (cw) that can be formatted by an
intensity modulator into trains of pulses. This observation led to new protocols for efficient quantum key distribution
(QKD) like the Differential-Phase-Shift (DPS) [10, 11] and the Coherent-One-Way (COW) [12, 13] protocols. In both
protocols a continuous train of weak laser pulses is sent from the sender, Alice, to the receiver, Bob. In the DPS
protocol the intensity of the pulses is constant, but the phase modulated. In the COW protocol, the phases of all
pulses are constant, but their intensity modulated. The DPS and the COW protocols are so-called distributed-phase-
reference protocols: the intervention of an adversary, Eve, is monitored by measuring the coherence between successive
non-empty pulses. Both protocols are robust against PNS attacks, because these can be detected [13, 14]; security has
also been studied against individual attacks [13, 15] and more recently against some form of intercept-resend attacks
based on unambiguous state discrimination [16, 17, 18]. However, security against the most general attacks is still
elusive: the tools, that have been developed in the last decade to tackle this, cannot be applied in any straightforward
way, because both protocols move away from the symbol-per-symbol type of coding.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the security of the COW and the DPS protocols against a large class of
collective attacks in the long distance regime (i.e. when the transmission coefficient t is small). This study leads also
to define variants of the COW protocol, which make it more robust while keeping its simplicity.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we recall the COW and DPS protocols, as well as some notions
of security bounds. In Section III, we present the bound for security against the beam-splitting attack (BSA) treated
as a collective attack. In Section IV, we study a family of attacks that generalize the BSA by introducing errors. The
basic idea is that the adversary, Eve, attaches ancillary quantum systems to each pulse or to each pair of pulses. For
these attacks, bounds for security are provided in the limits of large distances, typically d >∼ 50 km. These upper
bounds on the secret key rates scale linearly with t.
2II. DEFINITIONS AND TOOLS
The source, on Alice’s side, produces weak coherent pulses. A non-empty pulse is written |α〉, its mean photon
number µ = |α|2. The transmission coefficient of the quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob is t, the efficiency of
Bob’s photon counters is η; we neglect the effects of dark counts and dead times of the detectors. Accordingly, in the
absence of Eve, when Alice sends |α〉, Bob receives |√tα〉 and has a probability 1− e−µtη (≈ µtη in the limit µt≪ 1)
to detect a photon.
A. The COW and DPS codings
In the COW protocol, each bit is coded in a sequence of one non-empty and one empty pulse: the bit value 0 is
coded in the sequence |α〉|0〉, the bit value 1 in the sequence |0〉|α〉. These two states are not orthogonal because of
the vacuum component, and can be unambiguously discriminated in an optimal way by just measuring the time of
arrival. This is the very simple data line, in which the raw key is created. The quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q is,
as usual, the probability that Bob accepts the wrong value of the bit: in physical terms, this means that Bob has got
a detection in a time slot, in which Alice has sent an empty pulse. To estimate the loss of coherence in the channel
(and thence Eve’s information), a fraction of the light is sent into a monitoring line, consisting of an unbalanced
interferometer. The phase between the two arms is chosen so that two consecutive non-empty pulses sent by Alice
should always interfere constructively in one output port (and be detected with probability pD0 > 0) and destructively
in the other one (pD1 = 0). The departure from this ideal situation is measured by the visibility V =
pD0−pD1
pD0+pD1
of the
interference pattern observed for two consecutive non-empty pulses. Note that there is no a priori relation between
Q and V .
In the DPS protocol, Alice produces a sequence of coherent states of same intensity ...|eiϕk−1α〉|eiϕkα〉|eiϕk+1α〉...
where each phase can be set at ϕ = 0 or ϕ = pi. The bits are coded in the difference between two successive
phases: bk = 0 if e
iϕk = eiϕk+1 and bk = 1 otherwise. These two cases can be unambiguously discriminated using
an unbalanced interferometer. The same interferometer provides the information about the lack of coherence in the
channel, used to estimate Eve’s information. Contrary to what happens for COW, the QBER Q and the visibility V
of the interference pattern are tightly related in DPS through the relation Q = 1−V2 .
B. Three versions of COW
In the original version of COW, the pairing of the pulses is known in advance; in addition to sending the two
sequences that code for a bit value, Alice should also send decoy sequences |α〉|α〉 with probability f in order to
prevent a subtle form of photon-number-splitting attacks. Such sequences do not code for a bit value: therefore, if
they give rise to a detection in the data line, this event must be eliminated in sifting. Throughout this paper we
will set f ≈ 0: in fact, all the bounds for security that we are going to use are valid only in the asymptotic limit of
infinitely long keys, in which case an arbitrarily small amount of events is sufficient to produce meaningful statistics.
Along with this original version, we introduce and study here two modified versions of COW, in which the pairing
of the pulses is not known a priori by Bob, nor Eve. Alice and Bob’s devices are the same as in the original version:
Alice sends a train of empty or non-empty pulses; Bob measures the time of arrival on his data line and checks the
coherence of successive non-empty pulses on his monitoring line. Only after the transmission, Alice announces the
pairings publicly; the bit is accepted if Bob has got one and only one detection in the data line corresponding to that
pair of pulses. Given this, the two versions differ in the possible choices of pulses to be paired.
In COWm1, Alice still pairs consecutive pulses: this makes it the closest analog to DPS. If she wants to use (almost)
all the pulses, she will still send sequences |α〉|0〉 or |0〉|α〉, and sometimes introduce an unused pulse. In COWm2,
Alice is allowed to pair any two pulses; obviously, all the pulses are used. There is no simple version of DPS that
would be analog to COWm2, because in order to pair arbitrary pulses in DPS, Bob should arbitrarily change the
unbalance in the interferometer [19].
Note that many other variants of COW can be imagined, as we mention in Appendix A.
C. Secret key rates
We consider from now on that the two values 0 and 1 are equally probable both in Alice’s and in Bob’s list; since
this can be obtained by public communication, there is no loss in generality in this assumption. As said, the bound
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In this paper, we are concerned with specific attacks, which of course define only upper bounds for security (i.e., it
is guaranteed that one cannot obtain larger rates). In the family of attacks that we consider, Eve interacts with the
pulses one-by-one or two-by-two, always with the same strategy. She is allowed to keep her ancillae in a quantum
memory, and to extract the largest possible information out of them after Alice and Bob has run the classical post-
processing. Therefore, we will compute the bound for security against collective attacks (as in most QKD studies to
date, we compute this bound for the asymptotic case of an infinitely long raw key).
For collective attacks, Devetak and Winter [20] have shown that Eve’s information on Alice’s bits is bounded by the
maximal capacity of a channel Alice-Eve, in which Alice would code her bit value a in the state ρA=aE . This quantity
is called Holevo bound, and reads
χAE ≡ χ
(
ρA=0E , ρ
A=1
E
)
= S(ρE)− 1
2
S(ρA=0E )−
1
2
S(ρA=1E ) (1)
where ρE =
1
2ρ
A=0
E +
1
2ρ
A=1
E is Eve’s state and S is von Neumann entropy. A similar definition holds for Eve’s
information on Bob’s bits. Concerning the Alice-Bob channel, the QBER is Prob(A 6= B) = Q; in particular, for the
conditional Shannon entropy it holds H(A|B) = H(B|A) = h(Q) where h is the binary entropy. The Devetak-Winter
bound reads, for the secret key rate r:
r = rsift
[
1− h(Q)−min(χAE , χBE)
]
(2)
where rsift is the sifting rate, i.e. the probability that Alice and Bob accept a bit; we suppose that the two protocols
are run with the same repetition rate: the rates will be given ”per time slot” (or ”per pulse”, independently of whether
the pulse is empty or not). We work in the trusted-device scenario, in which one assumes that Eve cannot modify the
efficiency of Bob’s detectors. Note that the whole analysis can be readily adapted to the untrusted-device scenario by
replacing everywhere first η → 1, then t→ tη.
III. COLLECTIVE BEAM-SPLITTING ATTACK (Q = 0, V = 1)
The Beam-Splitting Attack (BSA) translates the fact that all the light that is lost in the channel must be given to
Eve. The attack consists in Eve simulating the losses 1− t by putting a beam-splitter just outside Alice’s laboratory,
and then forwarding the remaining photons to Bob through a lossless line. Since it simulates exactly Bob’s expected
optical mode, the BSA introduces no errors (here, Q = 0 and V = 1) and is therefore impossible to detect [21].
For both COW and DPS, Alice prepares a sequence of coherent states
⊗
k |αk〉: each αk is chosen in {+α, 0} for
COW, in {+α,−α} for DPS. Bob receives the state ⊗k |αk√t〉: Bob’s optical mode is not modified. Eve’s state is⊗
k |αk
√
1− t〉; let us introduce the notations αE = α
√
1− t, µE = |αE |2 and
γE = e
−µE = e−µ(1−t) . (3)
When Bob announces a detection involving pulses k− 1 and k, Eve shall extract the highest possible information out
of her systems, measured by the Holevo quantity (1). The information available to Eve differs for the two protocols,
because of the different coding of the bits.
In COW, the bit is 0 when αk−1 = α , αk = 0 and is 1 when αk−1 = 0 , αk = α; so, writing Pψ the projector on
|ψ〉, we have ρA=0E = ρB=0E = P+αE ,0 and ρA=1E = ρB=1E = P0,+αE ; therefore, noticing that |〈+αE , 0|0,+αE〉| = γE , we
obtain
χAE = χBE ≡ χCOWE (µ, t) = h
(
1− γE
2
)
. (4)
Since in COW half of the pulses are empty, the secret key rate is given by
rCOW (µ, t) =
1
2
(
1− e−µtη) [1− χCOWE (µ, t)] . (5)
Since BSA is a pulse-by-pulse attack independent of the pairing, the analysis is unchanged for COWm1 and COWm2.
In DPS, the bit is 0 when αk−1 = αk and is 1 when αk−1 = −αk. So, with similar notations as above, we have
ρA=0E = ρ
B=0
E =
1
2P+αE ,+αE +
1
2P−αE ,−αE and ρ
A=1
E = ρ
B=1
E =
1
2P+αE ,−αE +
1
2P−αE ,+αE ; therefore, noticing that
|〈+αE | − αE〉| = γ2E , we obtain
χAE = χBE ≡ χDPSE (µ, t) = 2 h
(
1− γ2E
2
)
− h
(
1− γ4E
2
)
(6)
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FIG. 1: Optimal mean photon number µ and secret key rate as a function of the distance, for the Beam-Splitting Attack on
the COW and DPS protocols. Detection efficiency: η = 0.1; Losses: 0.25 dB/km; no dark counts.
and the resulting secret key rate is
rDPS(µ, t) =
(
1− e−µtη) [1− χDPSE (µ, t)] . (7)
Both for COW and DPS, Alice and Bob should choose µ such that the secret key rate is maximized. We performed
this one-parameter optimization numerically. Figure 1 shows the optimal choice for the intensity µ = µopt and the
corresponding secret key rates for the COW and the DPS protocols.
One notices that the two protocols show similar behaviors against BSA. The optimal choice of µ is approximately
twice as large for COW as it is for DPS; since in COW one pulse out of two is empty, the number of photons per bit is
thus approximately the same. As for the secret key rates obtained for the respective µopt, they are very similar, within
a factor of two. The question, whether one protocol performs better than the other one, does not have a clear-cut
answer: other practical issues should be taken into considerations. For instance, we did not consider for COW the
fraction of the signal that should be sent through Bob’s monitoring line, which will not contribute to the key. We
did not consider the losses in Bob’s interferometer neither: in DPS, they will decrease the secret key rates, while in
COW, they will not alter the key rates. A more complete analysis should therefore lead to different factors before the
given key rates, and the factor of two that appears here between the two protocols is not meaningful in itself.
In the limit of large distances µt ≪ 1 (typically, for d >∼ 50km [22]), the secret key rates under a BSA become
linear in tη (r = r0tη), and the µopt tend to a constant value (dashed lines on Figure 1). Specifically: for COW,
µopt → 0.4583 and r0 ≈ 0.0714; for DPS, µopt → 0.2808 and r0 ≈ 0.1182. Note that the attacks presented in the next
Section of this paper shall be studied only in this limit, due to their complexity, and will coincide with the asymptotic
limits for BSA when Q = 0 and V = 1.
IV. COLLECTIVE ATTACKS WITH Q ≥ 0, V ≤ 1
In both COW and DPS, bits are coded in the relation between two successive pulses. In the study of upper bounds,
a natural class of attacks is therefore the one in which Eve attacks coherently pairs of successive pulses. These we
call “Two-Pulses Attacks” (2PA). In general, they are defined by
[|αk−1〉|αk〉]A(k−1,k) ⊗ |E〉E −→ |Ψ[αk−1, αk]〉B(k−1,k),E (8)
with the only constraint that the transformation must be unitary. This class is clearly too large to be parametrized
efficiently. However, in the limit of large distances µt ≪ 1, multi-photon components on Bob’s side are supposed to
be negligible; and Bob will have to check, through the statistics of his detection rates (singles, double-clicks in two
detectors etc), that this is indeed the case. In view of this, we restrict our study to the case where, for any two-pulse
signal sent by Alice, Bob’s Hilbert space consists only of the three orthogonal states |00〉 (no photon), |10〉 (one photon
at time k − 1) and |01〉 (one photon at time k).
In this Section, 2PA are studied on COW (IVA), on COWm1 (IVB) and on DPS (IVD). On COWm2, since there
is no preferred pairing at all, we shall rather study “One-Pulse Attacks”, 1PA (IVC). The resulting upper bounds
will be computed numerically and compared (IVE). Unless stated otherwise, pure and mixed quantum states are
normalized (in the limit µt≪ 1) in all that follows.
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1. Eve’s Attack
In the original COW protocol, the pairing of the pulses sent by Alice is publicly known. When Eve attacks the
pulses two by two, we suppose that she does it according to the same pairing. The three sequences that Alice can
send (bit 0, bit 1, decoy sequence) are modified by Eve’s intervention as
|√µ, 0〉
A
|E〉 −→ |00〉B |vµ0〉E +
√
(1 −Q)µt |10〉B|p10µ0〉E +
√
Qµt |01〉B|p01µ0〉E
|0,√µ〉
A
|E〉 −→ |00〉B |v0µ〉E +
√
Qµt |10〉B |p100µ〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt |01〉B|p010µ〉E
|√µ,√µ〉
A
|E〉 −→ |00〉B |vµµ〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt (|10〉B|p10µµ〉E + |01〉B|p01µµ〉E)
(9)
where |vjk〉E (j, k ∈ {0, µ}) are the states that Eve attaches to the vacuum part of the signal, while |p10jk〉E and
|p01jk〉E are the states that Eve attaches to the 1-photon part of the signal. While we have left Eve’s states free (up to
some constraints to be described soon), we have fixed the probability amplitude of each term. These amplitudes are
motivated by the expected behavior of an imperfect intensity modulator on Alice’s side, which would prepare pulses
of intensity (1 − Q)µ and Qµ instead of perfectly modulated intensities µ and 0. In this case, for each bit sequence
sent by Alice we still have an average probability µt that a photon arrives at Bob; in a fraction 1−Q of these cases,
it arrives at the correct time, in the other cases it arrives at the wrong time, whence Q is indeed the QBER. Again,
Bob has to check that the multi-photon components are negligible.
The relations between Eve’s states are constrained by the requirement that the transformation must be unitary,
and by the results of the parameter estimation (i.e. by the values of the visibilities). The requirement of unitarity
reads (recall that we work in the limit µt≪ 1)
〈v0µ|vµ0〉 = e−µ , 〈vµµ|vµ0〉 = 〈vµµ|v0µ〉 = e−µ/2 . (10)
The visibility in COW is measured only conditioned to the fact that Alice has sent two consecutive non-empty pulses.
There are five such cases: the case of decoy sequences (two non-empty pulses in the same pair) and the four two-pair
sequences (x, y) = (0µ, µ0),(µµ, µ0),(0µ, µµ),(µµ, µµ). The corresponding visibilities after Eve’s intervention are
Vµµ = Re
[〈p01µµ|p10µµ〉] , (11)
Vxy = Re
[〈vx|p01x 〉〈p10y |vy〉] . (12)
As an example, consider Vµµ. When Alice sends a decoy sequence |√µ,√µ〉, a detection in the interferometer at
the correct timing should reveal the coherence between |10〉 and |01〉. After Eve’s intervention, the action of the
interferometer (non-normalized) reads
|10〉B|p10µµ〉E + |01〉B|p01µµ〉E −→ |D0〉
(|p10µµ〉E + |p01µµ〉E)+ |D1〉(|p10µµ〉E − |p01µµ〉E) . (13)
The probability that the photon going to Bob is detected by detectorD0 (resp. D1) of the interferometer is proportional
to p0/1 ∝ |||p10µµ〉E ± |p01µµ〉E ||2 = 2 ± 2Re〈p01µµ|p10µµ〉 ∝ 1 ± Vµµ, whence (11). The visibilities Vxy are computed in a
similar way, considering that the interference across the pairing is due to the coherence between |01〉|00〉 and |00〉|10〉.
In the present study, we suppose that Alice and Bob check that all these visibilities are the same:
Vµµ = V0µ,µ0 = Vµµ,µ0 = V0µ,µµ = Vµµ,µµ ≡ V . (14)
2. Eve’s Information
The task is to compute the information that Eve obtains when she performs the attack (9). For each bit detected
by Bob, if Eve is interested in Alice’s bit, her information is the Holevo quantity χAE computed for ρ
A=0
E = (1 −
Q)|p10µ0〉〈p10µ0|+Q|p01µ0〉〈p01µ0| and ρA=1E = (1−Q)|p010µ〉〈p010µ|+Q|p100µ〉〈p100µ|; if Eve is interested in Bob’s bit, her information
is the Holevo quantity χBE computed for ρ
B=0
E = (1 − Q)|p10µ0〉〈p10µ0| + Q|p100µ〉〈p100µ| and ρB=1E = (1 − Q)|p010µ〉〈p010µ| +
Q|p01µ0〉〈p01µ0|. These are formal expressions, whose value has to be optimized under the constraints (10) and (14). Now,
none of the constraints (10), (11) and (12) on Eve’s states involves |p100µ〉 and |p01µ0〉. Eve can therefore choose these
two states freely, and the best choice is obviously to take them orthogonal to one another and to all her other states,
6in order to distinguish those cases perfectly. In this case, χAE = χBE = Q + (1 − Q)χ(Pp10
µ0
, Pp01
0µ
), that we write
explicitly as
χCOW = Q + (1−Q)h
(
1 + |〈p10µ0|p010µ〉|
2
)
. (15)
In particular, Eve has all the information on Alice’s and Bob’s bit when she introduces an error.
So finally, the Devetak-Winter bound for 2PA on COW in the limit µt≪ 1 reads
rCOW (Q, V ) = r0tη with r0 =
1
2
µ
[
1− h(Q)− χCOW
]
. (16)
Note that r0 does not depend on tη: the long-distance upper bound that we obtain is linear in t.
B. COWm1 coding: Two-Pulse Attacks
1. Eve’s Attack
We now consider the first modified version of the COW protocol (COWm1). In this version, the coding still implies
pairs of consecutive pulses, but the pairing is decided by Alice and Bob a posteriori. Thus, during the exchange of
quantum signals, Eve does not know which pulses she should attack together: half of the times, her 2PA will therefore
be applied on pulses that are not going to be paired to form a bit. In particular, now all four sequences of two
consecutive pulses are possible: the transformation (9) must be complemented with a fourth line
|0, 0〉A|E〉 −→ |00〉B|v00〉E +
√
Qµt
(|10〉B|p1000〉E + |01〉B|p0100〉E) (17)
where the choice of probability amplitude is dictated by the same considerations as above. The requirement of
unitarity consists of (10) and of the three additional constraints
〈v00|vµµ〉 = e−µ , 〈v00|vµ0〉 = 〈v00|v0µ〉 = e−µ/2 . (18)
The computation of the loss of visibility is identical to the case of the original COW, leading to (11) and (12); as for
that case, we shall impose (14). Note that the states |p100µ〉, |p01µ0〉, |p1000〉, |p0100〉 do not enter in any of the constraints,
and can therefore be chosen orthogonal to each other and to all other states.
2. Eve’s Information
When it comes to computing Eve’s information, two cases have to be treated separately:
Case 1: the two pulses that code a bit have been attacked together by Eve. In this case, the computation of Eve’s
information is the same for the original COW protocol (IVA), so χ
(2)
AE = χ
(2)
BE is given by (15).
Case 2: the two pulses that code a bit have not been attacked together by Eve. To study this case, we must consider
four pulses. Writing j, k, j′, k′ ∈ {0, 1} and neglecting as usual the two-photon terms, the transformation reads
|j√µ, k√µ〉
A
|j′√µ, k′√µ〉
A
|EE ′〉 −→
√
(k + (−1)kQ)µt|0100〉B |p01jµ,kµ, vj′µ,k′µ〉E
+
√
(j′ + (−1)j′Q)µt|0010〉B|vjµ,kµ, p10j′µ,k′µ〉E + ... (19)
The terms that we left out do not contribute, for we focus on the case where Bob detects a photon in one of the two
middle time-slots and pairs precisely those slots. Moreover, a posteriori it is decided that pulses j′ and k form a bit
a, i.e. Alice must have used j′ = 1− k = a. Depending on the sequence sent by Alice and on the bit detected by Bob,
Eve’s (unnormalized) state is thus
ρ
A={jk,j′k′},B=0
E4
= (k + (−1)kQ)|p01jµ,kµ, vj′µ,k′µ〉〈p01jµ,kµ, vj′µ,k′µ| (20)
ρ
A={jk,j′k′},B=1
E4
= (j′ + (−1)j′Q)|vjµ,kµ, p10j′µ,k′µ〉〈vjµ,kµ, p10j′µ,k′µ| . (21)
7Eve’s (now normalized) states conditioned on Alice’s or on Bob’s bit become
ρA=aE4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′,b
ρ
A={ja¯,ak′},B=b
E4
≡ (1 −Q)ρa,b=aE4 +Qρ
a,b=a¯
E4
(22)
ρB=bE4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′,a
ρ
A={ja¯,ak′},B=b
E4
≡ (1 −Q)ρa=b,bE4 +Qρ
a=b¯,b
E4
(23)
where a¯ = 1− a and b¯ = 1− b, and where
ρ0,0E4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′
|p01jµ,µ, v0,k′µ〉〈p01jµ,µ, v0,k′µ|, ρ0,1E4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′
|vjµ,µ, p100,k′µ〉〈vjµ,µ, p100,k′µ|, (24)
ρ1,1E4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′
|vjµ,0, p10µ,k′µ〉〈vjµ,0, p10µ,k′µ|, ρ1,0E4 =
1
4
∑
j,k′
|p01jµ,0, vµ,k′µ〉〈p01jµ,0, vµ,k′µ|. (25)
As it happened for COW, ρ1,0E4 and ρ
0,1
E4
are orthogonal to one another and to the other two mixtures; therefore
χ
(4)
AE = χ
(4)
BE = Q+ (1 −Q)χ(ρ0,0E4 , ρ
1,1
E4
).
On average, each of these two cases happens with probability 12 , so χAE = χBE is given by
χCOWm1 = Q+
1−Q
2
{
h
(
1 + |〈p10µ0|p010µ〉|
2
)
+ χ
(
ρ0,0E4 , ρ
1,1
E4
)}
. (26)
The Devetak-Winter bound for 2PA on COWm1 in the limit µt≪ 1 reads
rCOWm1(Q, V ) = r0tη with r0 =
1
2
µ
[
1− h(Q)− χCOWm1
]
. (27)
C. COWm2 coding: One-Pulse Attacks
1. Eve’s Attack
Let’s now consider the second modified version of the COW protocol (COWm2). In this version, Alice and Bob
check the coherence on successive pulses, but pair arbitrary pulses in order to define key bits. In this case, there is
no longer any natural definition of 2PA: almost always, Eve’s pairing shall not correspond to the pairing that defines
a bit. Therefore, we obtain the upper bound on COWm2 considering One-Pulse Attacks (1PA): we suppose that Eve
attaches a probe to each pulse sent by Alice, and performs the transformation
|0〉A|E〉 −→ |0〉B|v0〉E +
√
Qµt|1〉B|p0〉E
|√µ〉
A
|E〉 −→ |0〉B|vµ〉E +
√
(1 −Q)µt|1〉B |pµ〉E
(28)
where |v0/µ〉E are the states that Eve attaches to the vacuum part of the signal, while |p0/µ〉E are the states that
Eve attaches to the 1-photon part of the signal. The probability amplitudes are fixed according to the same physical
considerations done for COW and COWm1. The requirement of unitarity reads
〈v0|vµ〉 = e−µ/2 . (29)
The loss of visibility introduced by Eve’s intervention is computed along the same lines as in IVA. Suppose Alice
sends a sequence |√µ,√µ〉: in the limit µt ≪ 1, where we neglect the 2-photon terms, Eve’s intervention leads to
|00〉B |vµ, vµ〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt[|10〉B |pµ, vµ〉E + |01〉B|vµ, pµ〉E ] whence
V = Re
[〈vµ, pµ|pµ, vµ〉] = |〈vµ|pµ〉|2 . (30)
None of these constraints involves |p0〉, that can therefore be chosen orthogonal to all other states of Eve.
82. Eve’s Information
On any pair of pulses that define a bit, Eve’s intervention has the product structure
|√µ, 0〉
A
|EE ′〉 −→ |00〉B|vµ, v0〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt|10〉B|pµ, v0〉E +
√
Qµt|01〉B|vµ, p0〉E ,
|0,√µ〉
A
|EE ′〉 −→ |00〉B|v0, vµ〉E +
√
Qµt|10〉B|p0, vµ〉E +
√
(1 −Q)µt|01〉B|v0, pµ〉E .
(31)
For each bit detected by Bob, if Eve is interested in Alice’s bit, her information is the Holevo quantity χAE computed for
ρA=0E = (1−Q)|pµ, v0〉〈pµ, v0|+Q|vµ, p0〉〈vµ, p0| and ρA=1E = (1−Q)|v0, pµ〉〈v0, pµ|+Q|p0, vµ〉〈p0, vµ|; if Eve is interested
in Bob’s bit, her information is the Holevo quantity χBE computed for ρ
B=0
E = (1−Q)|pµ, v0〉〈pµ, v0|+Q|p0, vµ〉〈p0, vµ|
and ρB=1E = (1−Q)|v0, pµ〉〈v0, pµ|+Q|vµ, p0〉〈vµ, p0|. Since |vµ, p0〉 and |p0, vµ〉 are orthogonal to one another and to
the other states |pµ, v0〉 and |v0, pµ〉, we have χAE = χBE given by
χCOWm2 = Q+ (1−Q)h
(
1 + |〈v0|pµ〉|2
2
)
. (32)
So finally, the Devetak-Winter bound for 1PA on COWm2 in the limit µt≪ 1 reads
rCOWm2(Q, V ) = r0tη with r0 =
1
2
µ
[
1− h(Q)− χCOWm2
]
. (33)
D. DPS coding: Two-Pulse Attacks
We turn now to the DPS protocol and derive an upper bound for security considering 2PA. The formalism is analog
to the one described for the COWm1 protocol in subsection IVB, so we go fast through many details. The main
differences are of course those related to the protocol: the different coding of bits, and the link between Q and V .
1. Eve’s Attack
We suppose that Eve attaches her probe to two successive pulses sent by Alice. Four two-pulse sequences are
possible: with σ, ω ∈ {+,−}, Eve’s intervention reads
|σ√µ, ω√µ〉
A
|E〉 −→ |00〉B |vσω〉E +
√
µt
(
σ|10〉B |p10σω〉E + ω|01〉B|p01σω〉E
)
(34)
where |vσω〉E are the states that Eve attaches to the vacuum part of the signal, while |p10σω〉E and |p01σω〉E are the states
that Eve attaches to the 1-photon part of the signal (as before, Bob shall check that the multi-photon components are
negligible). The transformation leads to the expected detection rate µtη for each pulse. The constraint of unitarity
reads
〈v++|v−−〉 = 〈v+−|v−+〉 = e−4µ , (35)
〈v++|v+−〉 = 〈v++|v−+〉 = 〈v−−|v+−〉 = 〈v−−|v−+〉 = e−2µ . (36)
The visibilities can now be computed for all possible sequences, since there are no empty pulses. Formally, the
expressions depend on which sequence of pulses was sent, and on whether the two pulses that interfere belong to a
same or to different sequences according to the pairing chosen by Eve. The resulting visibilities are
Vσω = Re
[〈p01σω |p10σω〉] , (37)
Vσω,σ′ω′ = Re
[〈vσω |p01σω〉〈p10σ′ω′ |vσ′ω′〉] . (38)
Again, Alice and Bob shall check that all these visibilities are equal: for all σ, ω, σ′, ω′ ∈ {+,−},
Vσω = Vσω,σ′ω′ ≡ V . (39)
92. Eve’s Information
As it happened for COWm1, when it comes to computing Eve’s information, two cases have to be treated separately:
Case 1: the two pulses that contribute to the detected event have been attacked together by Eve. The evolution
in Bob’s interferometer is σ|10〉B |p10σω〉E + ω|01〉B|p01σω〉E −→
∑
b |Db〉|ψσ,ω,b〉E with |ψσ,ω,b〉 = σ|p10σω〉 + (−1)bω|p01σω〉
(non-normalized). Writing ρ
A={σω},B=b
E2
= |ψσ,ω,b〉〈ψσ,ω,b|, Eve’s normalized states conditioned on Alice’s bit are
ρA=0E2 =
1
8
∑
σ,b ρ
A={σσ},B=b
E2
and ρA=1E2 =
1
8
∑
σ,b ρ
A={σσ¯},B=b
E2
(where σ¯ = −σ); Eve’s normalized states conditioned on
Bob’s bit are ρB=bE2 =
1
8
∑
σ,ω ρ
A={σω},B=b
E2
. Eve’s information for this Case 1 is then
χ
(2)
AE = χ
(
ρA=0E2 , ρ
A=1
E2
)
, χ
(2)
BE = χ
(
ρB=0E2 , ρ
B=1
E2
)
. (40)
Case 2. the two pulses that contribute to the detected event have not been attacked together by
Eve. Then we have to study the four-pulse sequence, in which the bit has been produced by the inter-
ference of pulses number two and three. The evolution in Bob’s interferometer is ω|0100〉B |p01σω, vσ′ω′〉E +
σ′|0010〉B|vσω , p10σ′ω′〉E −→
∑
b |Db〉|ψσ,ω,σ′,ω′,b〉E with |ψσ,ω,σ′,ω′,b〉 = ω|p01σω〉|vσ′ω′〉 + (−1)bσ′|vσω〉|p10σ′ω′〉 (non-
normalized). Writing ρ
A={σω,σ′ω′},B=b
E4
= |ψσ,ω,σ′,ω′,b〉〈ψσ,ω,σ′,ω′,b|, Eve’s normalized states conditioned on Alice’s
bit are ρA=0E4 =
1
32
∑
σ,ω,ω′,b ρ
A={σω,ωω′},B=b
E4
and ρA=1E4 =
1
32
∑
σ,ω,ω′,b ρ
A={σω,ω¯ω′},B=b
E4
(where ω¯ = −ω); Eve’s normal-
ized states conditioned on Bob’s bit are ρB=bE4 =
1
32
∑
σ,ω,σ′,ω′ ρ
A={σω,σ′ω′},B=b
E4
. Eve’s information for this Case 2 is
then
χ
(4)
AE = χ
(
ρA=0E4 , ρ
A=1
E4
)
, χ
(4)
BE = χ
(
ρB=0E4 , ρ
B=1
E4
)
. (41)
Each of the two cases happens with probability 12 . Therefore, Eve’s average information is
χAE =
χ
(2)
AE + χ
(4)
AE
2
, χBE =
χ
(2)
BE + χ
(4)
BE
2
. (42)
For the versions of COW, some of Eve’s states could be immediately chosen as being orthogonal to all the other
ones; there is no such simplification here. The Devetak-Winter bound for 2PA on DPS in the limit µt≪ 1 reads
rDPS(Q, V ) = r0tη with r0 = µ
[
1− h
(1− V
2
)
−min(χAE , χBE)
]
. (43)
E. Numerical Optimization and Comparison
In the previous subsections, we have derived upper bounds for the secret key rate of COW (16), COWm1 (27),
COWm2 (33) and DPS (43) in the limit µt ≪ 1 of large distances. In this limit, all these bounds scale linearly with
losses: r = r0tη, where only the constant factor r0 depends on the protocol. Incidentally, we remind that for COWm1
and COWm2 we have supposed that Alice makes the pairings; if Bob would make them, the rates given above for
these protocols should be divided by 2.
At this point, we want to evaluate these bounds. This involves a double optimization: first, for a fixed value of µ,
one has to find the strategy that maximizes Eve’s information; then, one has to find the value of µ that maximizes r—
in our case, r0. The details, on how the optimizations over Eve’s strategies were performed, are given in Appendices B,
C, D and E. For COW and COWm2, these optimizations could be performed analytically, and we give the analytical
expressions for Eve’s optimal states. For COWm1, the optimization was performed numerically, but we could find
an analytical expression for Eve’s states, in which there remains only three parameters to optimize. For DPS, only
numerical optimizations could be performed. The second optimization (over µ) could only be done numerically in all
cases.
The results of the optimizations are shown in Figure 2 for the four protocols, as a function of V , and in the case
Q = 0 for all versions of COW. The effect of the QBER in the COW protocols is shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6.
As expected, when V = 1 and Q = 0, the attacks under study coincide for all protocols with the asymptotic limits
for BSA. As it was the case for BSA, one notices similar behaviors for the COW and the DPS protocols, at least
for high visibilities: the secret key rates (or the factors r0) are again very similar, within a factor of two. Again, we
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FIG. 3: Secret key rates as a function of the distance, for 2PA or 1PA on each protocol (for V = 0.98), compared to BSA. Same
parameters as in Figure 1. Recall that the bounds obtained for 2PA and 1PA are valid only in the limit of large distances.
cannot conclude that one protocol performs better than the other one. The choice of which protocol to run should be
motivated by various practical reasons that we did not consider here. Still, and as expected, the modified versions of
COW provide better bounds than the original COW: Eve’s attack is less efficient when Eve doesn’t know how Alice
and Bob will choose the pairing of the pulses.
Finally, in order to get the secret key rates for a given distance, one just has to multiply the factor r0 by tη. We
show as an example in Figure 3 the rates that we get for each protocol in the case of V = 0.98 (and still Q = 0 for
COW and its variations), compared to BSA.
V. CONCLUSION
We have provided new upper bounds for the security of the COW (the original and two modified versions) and the
DPS protocols, in the limit of large distances. In all cases, the secret key rate goes as r ≈ r0tη and scales therefore
linearly with the transmission t of the channel; also, all the values of r0 are similar, within a factor of two for high
visibilities. Hence, at least given our present-day knowledge, the choice between any of these protocols should be
dictated by practical reasons rather than by security concerns.
The two modified versions COWm1 and COWm2, introduced in a very natural way in the context of this paper, may
also prove very useful in the future to find the bound for security against the most general attack by the eavesdropper.
Indeed, intuition suggests that the random a posteriori choice of the pairing may provide the symmetry argument,
which would allow to use the exponential De Finetti theorem [23].
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APPENDIX A: OTHER POSSIBLE VARIANTS OF THE COW PROTOCOL
In the main text, we introduced two modified versions of COW. More generally, many other variants can be defined,
as we briefly mention in this Appendix. We give examples of such variants, that could be useful for future studies.
There are two main motivations for looking at possible variants: one is to find a more efficient or more robust
protocol (in the present case for instance, COWm1 and COWm2 were found to be more robust against the attacks
under study); the other one is to find a protocol for which it should be easier to prove the security (for instance, a
protocol with more symmetries, or where the signals that code for different bits would be more independent).
In all the following variants, Alice and Bob use the same devices as in the original COW protocol: Alice sends a
certain fraction q of weak coherent pulses |√µ〉 (with an overall phase relationship) and a fraction 1 − q of empty
pulses |0〉; Bob measures the time of arrival on his data line and checks the coherence of successive non-empty pulses
on his monitoring line. The only differences lie in the way the classical information is encoded, or in how the key
reconciliation is performed.
We do not provide here a security analysis for the following variants; nonetheless, in order to give a rough idea of
how the various versions should perform, we estimate the sifting rate rs and the ideal mutual information per sifted
pulse IAB between Alice and Bob in the limit of large distances (µt ≪ 1), in the absence of an eavesdropper and
without dark counts. The ideal key rate would then be r = rsIAB .
The simplest possible coding is that the logical bit value 1 is coded as a non-empty pulse |√µ〉 and the bit 0 as an
empty pulse |0〉. In such a simple coding, the raw key is as long as the entire train of pulses: rs = 1 (as for instance
in continuous variable QKD [24]). However, even in the absence of an adversary and of dark counts, the error rate is
large: Bob is very likely to fail detecting a non-empty pulse, and the quantum channel acts as a Z-channel, where the
bit 0 is always detected correctly, while the bit 1 has a high probability e−µtη to be detected as a 0. Straightforward
application of Shannon channel capacity shows that in the ideal case, IAB = h(qµtη) − qh(µtη) ≈ −q log2 q µtη. For
the optimal choice of q = e−1 one finds: r ≈ e−1ln 2 µtη ≈ 0.53 µtη.
In practice, the main drawback of this basic protocol is the large error rate. In fact, while IAB can in principle
be extracted by error correction (which we have supposed everywhere in this paper), real codes do not reach this
bound and become very inefficient if the error rate is large. In other words, it is better to try and have fewer, better
correlated signals, than to keep a lot of poorly correlated ones. One possibility to reduce this error rate is to include
a sifting step: Bob would announce his qµtη fraction of time slots where he got a click on his data line, along with
another fraction f0 where he had no click. In this case, the sifting rate reduces to rs = qµtη + f0, but the fraction
of errors to be corrected is also reduced. Depending on the practical efficiency of the error correction, one can try to
optimize f0.
When dealing with such a Z-channel, a way to symmetrize the errors is to code the logical bits into two physical
symbols: ‘0’→ µ0, ‘1’→ 0µ. In this prospect, the original coding of COW appears very naturally. Contrary to the
previous version, there are no more errors due to the losses (Bob only keeps the cases where he had one detection),
and in the absence of dark counts and of Eve IAB = 1, and r = rs.
In the original version of COW, the pairs of pulses defining each classical bit are predefined. Alice sends pairs µ0
or 0µ, along with some decoy sequences µµ (and possibly also sequences 00). When the fraction of decoy sequences
is negligible, the sifting rate is rs =
1
2µtη.
A first possible variant of this original COW corresponds to COWm1, where Alice still sends sequences µ0 or 0µ,
but sometimes she introduces an unused pulse, so that the bit separations are not known in advance by Eve. Again,
if the fraction of unused pulses is negligible, the sifting rate is rs =
1
2µtη.
Another variant would be that Alice sends a completely random train of pulses |0〉 and |√µ〉. She then pairs
consecutive pulses a posteriori. Here we lose a factor 12 in the sifting rate (rs =
1
4µtη) because of the sequences 00
and µµ that Alice sometimes pairs together, but the security might be easier to analyze.
In the previous two variants, one can also imagine that the pairs are not necessarily composed of successive pulses
(such as in COWm2 for instance). This might be more robust against Eve’s attacks, but this necessitates a large
amount of information to be sent from Alice to Bob for the key reconciliation.
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Also, one can imagine that it is Bob who chooses the pairing: when he gets a detection, he announces two time-slots
(successive or not), and Alice checks that they correspond to a sequence µ0 or 0µ. Since Bob has approximately a
probability 12 to announce two time-slots that correspond to a sequence µµ instead, the sifting rate in this case is
rs ≈ 14µtη.
Finally, one can imagine that Alice and Bob use other (longer) sequences of pulses |√µ〉 and |0〉 to encode their
classical bits (or dits). All previous variations, whether the way the pulses are grouped is defined a priori or a
posteriori, by Alice or by Bob, whether they group successive pulses or not, also apply to this more general variant.
APPENDIX B: OPTIMIZATION OF 2PA ON COW
We have to maximize χCOW (15), i.e. to minimize |〈p010µ|p10µ0〉|, submitted to the constraints
〈v0µ|vµ0〉 = e−µ ≡ γ , 〈vµµ|vµ0〉 = 〈vµµ|v0µ〉 = e−µ/2 , (B1)
Re
[〈p01µµ|p10µµ〉] = Re[〈vx|p01x 〉〈p10y |vy〉] = V (B2)
for the four two-pair sequences (x, y) = (0µ, µ0),(µµ, µ0),(0µ, µµ),(µµ, µµ). We notice that the states |p10µ0〉 and |p010µ〉,
whose overlap fully defines Eve’s information, are related to the states |vµ0〉 and |v0µ〉 through (B2), specifically
Re
[〈v0µ|p010µ〉〈p10µ0|vµ0〉] = V . (B3)
So, we focus at first only on finding four states |vµ0〉, |v0µ〉, |p10µ0〉 and |p010µ〉 that satisfy (B3) and such that |〈p010µ|p10µ0〉|
is minimal. Later, we shall check that we can find states |vµµ〉, |p10µµ〉, and |p01µµ〉 in order to satisfy all the constraints
(recall that the states |p01µ0〉 and |p100µ〉 are chosen to be orthogonal to all other states).
1. Parametrization of Eve’s states
First, let’s choose the first 2 basis vectors such that the states |vµ0〉 and |v0µ〉 read
|vµ0〉 =


√
1+γ
2√
1−γ
2

 , |v0µ〉 =


√
1+γ
2
−
√
1−γ
2

 . (B4)
Let’s also define |v⊥j 〉 as the orthogonal state to |vj〉, in the same 2-dimensional subspace:
|v⊥µ0〉 =


√
1−γ
2
−
√
1+γ
2

 , |v⊥0µ〉 =


√
1−γ
2√
1+γ
2

 . (B5)
We must have (B3). Now, if 〈v0µ|p010µ〉〈p10µ0|vµ0〉 /∈ R, then Eve could just add a global phase to |p10µ0〉 for instance,
and increase V without changing her information. This implies that Eve’s maximal information compatible with V
is obtained when the above quantity is real. Then we can write, for some factor λ ∈ [V, 1/V ] and some phase φ˜ ∈ R:
〈vµ0|p10µ0〉 =
√
λV eiφ˜ and 〈v0µ|p010µ〉 =
√
V/λeiφ˜. But since the phase φ˜ does not play any role in Eve’s information
(which depends only on |〈p010µ|p10µ0〉|), we can without loss of generality set it to 0. In conclusion, |p10µ0〉 and |p010µ〉 are
of the form
|p10µ0〉 =
√
λV |vµ0〉 −
√
1− λV cos θ0eiφ0 |v⊥µ0〉+
√
1− λV sin θ0|w0〉 (B6)
|p010µ〉 =
√
V/λ|v0µ〉 −
√
1− V/λ cos θ1eiφ1 |v⊥0µ〉+
√
1− V/λ sin θ1|w1〉 (B7)
where |w0〉 and |w1〉 are any states orthogonal to both |vµ0〉 and |v0µ〉 and θ0, θ1, φ0 and φ1 are free parameters.
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FIG. 4: COW, original version: µopt and r0 for 2PA, for different values of Q.
2. Results of the optimization
For γ > 2
√
V (1 − V ) (i.e. µ small enough) and V > 1/2, it can be proved analytically [25] that the minimum of
|〈p010µ|p10µ0〉| is
|〈p010µ|p10µ0〉| = (2V − 1)γ − 2
√
V (1− V )
√
1− γ2 (B8)
obtained for λ = 1, θ0 = θ1 = φ0 = φ1 = 0, in which case |p10µ0〉 =
√
V |vµ0〉 −
√
1− V |v⊥µ0〉, |p010µ〉 =
√
V |v0µ〉 −√
1− V |v⊥0µ〉. Having maximized Eve’s information, one can run the one-parameter optimization over the pulse
intensity µ. The optimal choice µopt and the corresponding value of r0 are plotted in Fig. 4, as a function of V and
for different values of Q.
We still have to check that we can find states |vµµ〉, |p10µµ〉, and |p01µµ〉 that satisfy all the constraints. This is indeed
the case. For instance, we complete the previous basis with a third orthogonal vector and choose
|vµµ〉 =


√
2γ
1+γ
0√
1−γ
1+γ

 , |p10µµ〉 =


√
1+V
2 c√
1−V
2√
1+V
2 s

 , |p01µµ〉 =


√
1+V
2 c
−
√
1−V
2√
1+V
2 s

 (B9)
with c =
√
2V
1+V
√
2γ
1+γ +
√
1−V
1+V
√
1−γ
1+γ , s =
√
2V
1+V
√
1−γ
1+γ −
√
1−V
1+V
√
2γ
1+γ . The fact, that the minimum of |〈p010µ|p10µ0〉| can
be reached without using the constraints that involve the sequence (µ, µ) means that the presence of decoy sequences
does not increase the security of COW against 2PA.
Note finally that if γ ≤ 2
√
V (1− V ) or if V ≤ 1/2, Eve can choose her states |p10µ0〉 and |p010µ〉 (for instance
λ = 1, cos θ0 =
γV
(1−V )γ+2
√
V (1−V )
√
1−γ2
, θ1 = φ0 = φ1 = 0) such that 〈p010µ|p10µ0〉 = 0, in which case Eve can perfectly
discriminate the two states: she has the full information on Alice and Bob’s bit. Therefore, γ > 2
√
V (1− V ) and
V > 1/2 are necessary conditions for Alice and Bob to establish a secret key.
APPENDIX C: OPTIMIZATION OF 2PA ON COWm1
We have to maximize χCOWm1 (26) submitted to the constraints (B1), (B2) and
〈v00|vµµ〉 = e−µ ≡ γ , 〈v00|vµ0〉 = 〈v00|v0µ〉 = e−µ/2 . (C1)
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1. Parametrization of Eve’s states
We write the states |vjk〉 as
|vµ0〉 =


√
1+γ
2√
1−γ
2
0
0

 , |v0µ〉 =


√
1+γ
2
−
√
1−γ
2
0
0

 , |v00〉 =


√
2γ
1+γ
0√
1−γ
1+γ
0

 , |vµµ〉 =


√
2γ
1+γ
0
−γ
√
1−γ
1+γ
1− γ

 . (C2)
These states satisfy the constraints (B1) and (C1). We still have four states to consider, |p10µ0〉, |p010µ〉, |p10µµ〉 and |p01µµ〉
(recall that the states |p01µ0〉, |p100µ〉, |p10µµ〉 and |p01µµ〉 have already been chosen orthogonal to all other states). Therefore,
Eve’s states under consideration live in general in an eight-dimensional space. We have performed the numerical
optimization over the most general choice of the four |p〉 states that satisfied the constraints (B2).
2. Results of the optimization
The best attack we found can be realized by four-dimensional states and depends only on three free parameters
(θ0, θ1, φ), that are still to be optimized. Let’s introduce the following vectors:
|v⊥µ0〉 =


√
1−γ
2
−
√
1+γ
2
0
0

 , |v⊥0µ〉 =


√
1−γ
2√
1+γ
2
0
0

 , |v⊥,1µµ 〉 =


0
0√
1− γ2
γ

 , |v⊥,2µµ 〉 =


√
1−γ
1+γ
0
γ
√
2γ
1+γ
−√2γ√1− γ

 , (C3)
|w2〉 =


0
1
0
0

 , |w3〉 =


0
0
1
0

 , |w4〉 =


0
0
0
1

 . (C4)
Our best attack is then defined by
|p10µ0〉 =
√
V |vµ0〉 −
√
1− V |wµ0〉 , |p010µ〉 =
√
V |v0µ〉 −
√
1− V |w0µ〉 , (C5)
|p10µµ〉 =
√
V |vµµ〉 −
√
1− V |w10µµ〉 , |p01µµ〉 =
√
V |vµµ〉 −
√
1− V |w01µµ〉 , (C6)
where
|wµ0〉 = cos θ0 |v⊥µ0〉+ sin θ0 cos θ1 |w3〉+ sin θ0 sin θ1 |w4〉 , (C7)
|w0µ〉 = cos θ0 |v⊥0µ〉+ sin θ0 cos θ1 |w3〉+ sin θ0 sin θ1 |w4〉 , (C8)
|w10µµ〉 =
1√
2
(cosφ |v⊥,1µµ 〉+ sinφ |v⊥,2µµ 〉)−
1√
2
|w2〉 , (C9)
|w01µµ〉 =
1√
2
(cosφ |v⊥,1µµ 〉+ sinφ |v⊥,2µµ 〉) +
1√
2
|w2〉 . (C10)
Note that these states satisfy a more constraining version of (B2): 〈p01µµ|p10µµ〉 = V, 〈v0µ|p010µ〉 = 〈vµµ|p01µµ〉 = 〈p10µ0|vµ0〉 =
〈p10µµ|vµµ〉 =
√
V . Finally, the optimization over the three remaining parameters θ0, θ1 and φ was performed numeri-
cally.
Having maximized Eve’s information, one can run the one-parameter optimization over the pulse intensity µ. The
optimal choice µopt and the corresponding value of r0 are plotted in Fig. 5.
APPENDIX D: OPTIMIZATION OF 1PA ON COWm2
We have to maximize χCOWm2 (32), i.e. to minimize |〈v0|pµ〉|, submitted to the constraints
〈v0|vµ〉 = e−µ/2 , (D1)
|〈vµ|pµ〉|2 = V . (D2)
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FIG. 5: COWm1: µopt and r0 for 2PA, for different values of Q.
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FIG. 6: COWm2: µopt and r0 for 1PA, for different values of Q.
The state |p0〉 was already chosen to be orthogonal to the three other states; we have therefore to work in a three-
dimensional Hilbert space. Without loss of generality, we choose the following parametrization, which ensures auto-
matically that the constraints are satisfied:
|vµ〉 =

 10
0

 , |v0〉 =

 e−µ/2√1− e−µ
0

 , |pµ〉 = eiφ˜


√
V
−√1− V cos θeiφ√
1− V sin θ

 ; (D3)
actually the phase φ˜ does not play any role, and we set it to be 0. So, for a given V and a given µ, Eve’s states are
parametrized by θ and φ.
For e−µ ≤ 1 − V , Eve can choose φ = 0 and cos θ =
√
e−µ
1−e−µ
V
1−V , which gives 〈v0|pµ〉 = 0: in this case, Eve has
full information on Alice and Bob’s bit. A necessary condition for Alice and Bob to have secret bits is therefore to
choose µ such that e−µ > 1− V . In this case, one can easily show that the minimum overlap is
|〈v0|pµ〉| = e−µ/2
√
V −
√
1− e−µ
√
1− V (D4)
obtained by setting θ = φ = 0.
Having maximized Eve’s information, one can run the one-parameter optimization over the pulse intensity µ. The
optimal choice µopt and the corresponding value of r0 are plotted in Fig. 6.
APPENDIX E: OPTIMIZATION OF 1PA AND 2PA ON DPS
As mentioned in the main text, the optimization of Eve’s information for a 2PA on DPS is more complicated than
the one for COW, because we could not find any evident simplification and had therefore to start from the general
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formal expressions. For this reason, we find it useful to sketch first the study of 1PA on DPS — were it only to show
that our optimization on the 2PA yields indeed a more strict bound.
1. Optimization of 1PA on DPS
a. Eve’s Attack and Information
We have not studied 1PA on DPS in the main text, but the pattern is the same as for all other attacks, so we just
list the main points. Eve’s attacks is defined by (with σ ∈ {+,−})
|σ√µ〉
A
|E〉 −→ |0〉B|vσ〉E + σ
√
µt|1〉B|pσ〉E (E1)
so the unitarity condition and the visibility constraints read
〈v+|v−〉 = e−2µ ≡ γ (E2)
∀σ, ω ∈ {+,−}, Re[〈vσ|pσ〉〈pω|vω〉] = V . (E3)
This last condition implies 〈v+|p+〉 = 〈v−|p−〉 =
√
V eiφ˜, for some φ˜ which won’t play any role, and which we set to
0; so we have
〈v+|p+〉 = 〈v−|p−〉 =
√
V . (E4)
Note how all the states participate in the constraints, contrary to what is the case in all versions of COW.
To compute Eve’s information, we start from Eve’s conditioned states ρ
A={σω},B=b
E = |ψσ,ω,b〉〈ψσ,ω,b| with |ψσ,ω,b〉 =
σ|pσ, vω〉+(−1)bω|vσ, pω〉 and the mixtures ρa,bE = 18
∑
σ ρ
A={σσ(a)},B=b
E where σ(a) = (−1)aσ. Note that these states
are not normalized; rather, Tr
(
ρa,bE
)
is equal to 1+V2 = 1−Q if a = b, and to 1−V2 = Q if a 6= b. Finally, ρA=aE =
∑
b ρ
a,b
E
and ρB=bE =
∑
b ρ
a,b
E (now normalized). Eve’s information is given by χAE = χ
(
ρA=0E , ρ
A=1
E
)
, and similarly for χBE .
b. Parametrization of Eve’s states
Eve’s states can be chosen in a four-dimensional Hilbert space. First, let’s choose a basis with the first two vectors
in the subspace spanned by {|v+〉, |v−〉}, and in which |v+〉 and |v−〉 read
|vσ〉 =


√
1+γ
2
σ
√
1−γ
2
0
0

 (E5)
so that (E2) is satisfied. Let’s also define |v⊥σ 〉 as the orthogonal state to |vσ〉, in the subspace spanned by {|v+〉, |v−〉}:
|v⊥σ 〉 =


√
1−γ
2
−σ
√
1+γ
2
0
0

 . (E6)
The constraint (E4) on the visibility implies that |pσ〉 can be written as |pσ〉 =
√
V |vσ〉 −
√
1− V |wσ〉, where |wσ〉 is
any (4-dimensional) state orthogonal to |vσ〉; this can be further decomposed as |wσ〉 = cos θσeiφσ |v⊥σ 〉 + sin θσ|w′σ〉
for some states |w′σ〉 orthogonal to both |v+〉 and |v−〉. Finally we choose the last two vectors of the basis such that
|w′+〉 and |w′−〉 read
|w′+〉 =


0
0
cos(θ/2)eiφ/2
sin(θ/2)eiφ/2

 , |w′−〉 =


0
0
cos(θ/2)e−iφ/2
− sin(θ/2)e−iφ/2

 . (E7)
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In summary, for a given V and a given µ, we are left without loss of generality with the six free parameters
θ+, θ−, θ, φ+, φ−, φ that define
|pσ〉 =
√
V |vσ〉 −
√
1− V cos θσeiφσ |v⊥σ 〉 −
√
1− V sin θσ|w′σ〉 . (E8)
c. Results of the optimization
The optimization over the six free parameters was performed numerically. We find that Eve’s optimal states have
real coefficients (the parameters φ±, φ can be chosen to be 0), and also that θ+ = −θ−. Once we fix this, there
remains only two free parameters to optimize.
Having maximized Eve’s information, one can run the one-parameter optimization over the pulse intensity µ. The
optimal choice µopt and the corresponding value of r0 are plotted in Fig. 7, along with the results for 2PA. In the case
V = 1, this attack reduces to the BSA; in all other cases, the optimal 1PA is manifestly less powerful than the best
2PA we have found.
Note that after optimization, we find χAE ≤ χBE : Eve knows less about Alice’s bit than about Bob’s.
2. Optimization of 2PA on DPS
We now consider the 2PA on DPS, and we have to optimize χAE and χBE as given in (42), submitted to the
constraints
〈vσω |vσω¯〉 = 〈vσω |vσ¯ω〉 = e−2µ ≡ γ , 〈vσω |vσ¯ω¯〉 = e−4µ = γ2 , (E9)
Re
[〈p01σω|p10σω〉] = Re[〈vσω |p01σω〉〈p10σ′ω′ |vσ′ω′〉] = V (E10)
for all σ, ω, σ′, ω′ ∈ {+,−}. We see that all the twelve states of Eve appear in the expressions of the constraints.
a. Parametrization of Eve’s states
Without any loss of generality, we choose the following symmetric parametrization for Eve’s four states |vσω〉:
|v++〉 =


1+γ
2
1−γ
2√
1−γ2
2
0

 , |v−−〉 =


1+γ
2
1−γ
2
−
√
1−γ2
2
0

 , |v+−〉 =


1+γ
2
− 1−γ2
0√
1−γ2
2

 , |v−+〉 =


1+γ
2
− 1−γ2
0
−
√
1−γ2
2

 (E11)
so that (E9) is satisfied. At this point, we would have to optimize over Eve’s most general states |p10σω〉 and |p01σω〉 that
satisfied the constraints (E10). In general, these eight states live in a 12-dimensional space, and the number of free
parameters is quite large.
In order to have a more tractable problem, we make some assumptions (admittedly, we lose generality here). First,
we look for states that satisfy a more constraining version of (E10), namely
〈p01σω |p10σω〉 = V , 〈vσω |p01σω〉 = 〈vσω |p10σω〉 =
√
V (E12)
for all σ, ω. Then we can write
|p01σω〉 =
√
V |vσω〉 −
√
1− V |w01σω〉 (E13)
|p10σω〉 =
√
V |vσω〉 −
√
1− V |w10σω〉 (E14)
with 〈vσω |w01σω〉 = 〈vσω |w10σω〉 = 0 and 〈w01σω |w10σω〉 = 0. Note that this may not be a true restriction: actually, for all
the cases treated above, an analog choice was found to be optimal. A more serious restriction comes now: we suppose
that the eight states |w10σω〉 and |w01σω〉 live in a 6-dimensional space and are parametrized only by real coefficients. At
this stage, we run the numerical optimization.
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FIG. 7: µopt and r0 for 1PA and 2PA on DPS.
b. Results of the optimization
After having maximized Eve’s information, one can run the one-parameter optimization over the pulse intensity µ.
The optimal choice µopt and the corresponding value of r0 are plotted in Fig. 7, along with the results for 1PA. In
the case V = 1, this attack reduces again to the BSA.
We didn’t run the optimization aver all possible states, but we believe that our results are very close to the optimal
bounds we could get for 2PA on DPS. Anyway, even though we might have missed the true maximum of Eve’s
information, the attack we found and the curves that are plotted still provide valid upper bounds, more strict than
the bounds given by 1PA on DPS.
Note finally that as for 1PA, we find after optimization χAE ≤ χBE : Eve knows less about Alice’s bit than about
Bob’s.
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